JURORS DISCLOSING INFORMATION Present law
4.41 Historically, it was assumed that jury deliberations were confidential. Some took the view that this meant that a breach of confidentiality would be contempt at common law, 84 although this was by no means a unanimous opinion. 85 However, following the New Statesman's disclosure of the jury's deliberations in the Jeremy Thorpe trial, which was held not to be in contempt, 86 a specific contempt was introduced as section 8 of the Contempt of Court Act. This provides:
8.-Confidentiality of jury's deliberations.
(1) Subject to subsection (2) below, it is a contempt of court to obtain, disclose or solicit any particulars of statements made, opinions expressed, arguments advanced or votes cast by members of a jury in the course of their deliberations in any legal proceedings.
(2) This section does not apply to any disclosure of any particulars-(a) in the proceedings in question for the purpose of enabling the jury to arrive at their verdict, or in connection with the delivery of that verdict, or (b) in evidence in any subsequent proceedings for an offence alleged to have been committed in relation to the jury in the first mentioned proceedings, or to the publication of any particulars so disclosed.
4.42 Clause 8, as originally introduced in the Contempt of Court Bill, only prohibited disclosure of deliberations which identified either the case itself or the juror, and, therefore, would allow "bona fide" research. 87 That proposal did not survive the Parliamentary debates. 88 4.43 Various terms within the section are ambiguous. The section only applies to "deliberations" and, therefore, some have argued that it has no application where no deliberations have occurred, for example, if the jury is discharged at the end of 84 See Appendix A on confidentiality of jury deliberations. 85 See the examples in the report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee, the prosecution case. 89 It is not clear whether the limited case law supports such an interpretation. 90 It has been held that "disclose" under section 8 should be given its ordinary English meaning, and that, therefore, it covers both direct and indirect disclosure. 91 The word "solicit" meanwhile is "directed to persons who seek to obtain the information from anyone else who is in possession of it". 92 The mental element for breach of section 8 is intention. 93 However, it remains unclear whether specific "intention to interfere with the course of justice" is required, or merely intentional disclosure or soliciting. 94 4.44 Human rights challenges have been made to section 8. In Attorney General v Scotcher 95 it was argued that a defence of uncovering a miscarriage of justice by protecting the right to a fair trial should be read into section 8 in order for it to be article 10 compliant. The House of Lords held that such a defence was unnecessary because disclosure to a court (even after a verdict) was not prohibited 96 and, therefore, had the juror written to the court or judge, the section would not be breached. 97 Furthermore, section 8 did not preclude the judge from inquiring into concerns which had been disclosed to the court before the verdict was delivered. 98 In consequence, the law was held to be ECHR compliant because the interference through section 8 with the juror's article 10 right was 89 concerns about a trial on which he had sat as a juror. The court held that section 8 as an "absolute rule cannot be viewed as being unreasonable or disproportionate" given the importance of promoting "free and frank discussion" through the confidentiality of deliberations.
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In consequence, there was no violation of article 10. However, notably, the court observed that it was:
Not called upon in the present case to assess the compatibility with article 10 of section 8 in circumstances involving a conviction for research into jury methods. Nor is the court concerned with a case where the interests of justice could be said to require the disclosure of the jury's deliberations. 4.46 The interpretation of section 8 is closely related to the issue of the common law inadmissibility of jury deliberations. The inadmissibility rule was explained in Smith:
(1) The general rule is that the court will not investigate, or receive evidence about, anything said in the course of the jury's deliberations while they are considering their verdict in their retiring room … .
(2) An exception to the above rule may exist if an allegation is made which tends to show that the jury as a whole declined to deliberate at all, but decided the case by other means such as drawing lots or tossing a coin. Such conduct would be a negation of the function of a jury and a trial whose result was determined in such a manner would not be a trial at all … .
(3) There is a firm rule that after the verdict has been delivered evidence directed to matters intrinsic to the deliberations of jurors is inadmissible … .
(4) The common law has recognised exceptions to the rule, confined to situations where the jury is alleged to have been affected by what are termed extraneous influences … . 4.47 Therefore, in essence, evidence of jury deliberations is inadmissible in any subsequent proceedings subject to the exception under section 8(2)(b), explained above, and to situations where the jury has been influenced by external material. Clearly, the issue of admissibility of evidence is separate to that of liability of jurors for disclosure, but nonetheless, the two are obviously closely related because the existence of evidence depends on there having been such disclosure. 104 it was held that section 8 did not affect the Court of Appeal's jurisdiction to hear evidence relevant to an appeal (because a court cannot be in contempt of itself), subject to the common law rule on inadmissibility. That rule was held to be article 6 compliant on the basis of the importance of jury secrecy to the legal process and because the trial court can investigate allegations of misconduct or bias before a verdict is returned. 105 This decision was strongly criticised for its reasoning that the "residual possibility of a miscarriage of justice was … the necessary price to be paid for the preservation and protection of the jury system". 4.49 Breach of section 8 is punishable by a fine or imprisonment for up to two years. 107 In the recent case where a juror (Fraill) and one of the defendants in the trial (Sewart) had discussed the jury's deliberations on the social networking site Facebook, Fraill was sentenced to eight months' imprisonment, whilst Sewart received a sentence of two months' imprisonment, suspended for two years. uncovered in the New Statesman case. 109 In that case, Lord Chief Justice Widgery suggested that some restrictions on disclosure were needed but not that the restrictions had to be absolute. His Lordship acknowledged that there had previously been many unproblematic disclosures where the individuals involved were not identified. 4.51 Additionally, it has been argued that, despite the case law, section 8 may be incompatible with article 10 because its "absolute nature" makes it a disproportionate interference with freedom of expression. 111 This, it is suggested, is particularly so when the disclosure seeks to uncover a miscarriage of justice. 112 4.52 Aside from concerns about miscarriages of justice, there is an important public interest in subjecting the jury system to scrutiny by the media. 113 Fenwick and Phillipson have even gone so far as to suggest that, in some circumstances, there may be a public interest justification in allowing jurors to disclose details of their deliberations, for example, if a defendant were acquitted of rape because of jurors' sexist attitudes. 114 Allowing for greater public scrutiny of the jury system could lead to its improvement. 115 Robertson and Nicol argue that section 8 is designed to prevent "informed criticism of the jury system, which is precisely why" it offends article 10. 4.53 There is also a public interest in research being undertaken into the system of trial by jury. 117 Academic views on the impact of section 8 on jury research differ, with some arguing it makes such research "impossible" 118 whilst others consider that section 8 "does not in fact prevent most research about juries". research can and cannot be conducted and has contributed to an information vacuum about juries in this country". 120 4.54 The ECtHR has thus far not needed to address whether section 8 is compatible with article 10 when it comes to disclosure in the public interest, whether in respect of miscarriages of justice or for academic research. However, it has implied that there may be concerns about compatibility. 121 Nonetheless, it has been argued that in an era when the openness and accountability of the judicial system has come to be highly regarded, the secrecy of jury deliberations looks increasingly out of step. been argued that jurors must feel that they can express their views, without fear of ridicule or recriminations. 123 Additionally, the jury's verdict should be final. Prohibiting the disclosure of deliberations prevents the reopening of cases 124 and a subsequent "retrial" by media, especially following an acquittal. 125 The privacy and security of jurors also needs to be protected (in particular, where the media may try to contact them).
In Mirza
126 It may also be argued that the fact that a juror can raise concerns with the court, without breaching section 8, is sufficient to establish ECHR compatibility. Finally, there is a risk that jurors could be induced or intimidated into making false disclosures if such evidence were admissible on appeal. 127 It is also notable that the prohibition in section 8 has the support of jurors: Thomas' study found that 82% "felt it was correct that jurors should not be allowed to speak about what happens in the deliberating room". 128 4.56 Leaving aside whether in principle section 8 should be maintained, there may be concerns that the section is being increasingly flouted. The internet and social media may make it easier for friends, families and others to identify and communicate with jurors to solicit information about their jury service. 129 Likewise, it may be easier for jurors to contact parties relevant to the trial and to communicate anonymously and instantly with them and others. 130 In the USA one study found that nationally a tweet referring to "jury duty" was posted almost every three minutes.
131 Empirical research about the nature and scope of the problem in England and Wales is very limited. A similar survey by The Times "claimed to have found more than 40 examples of public postings and statements that appeared to be in breach of the law", 132 although another study appeared to find fewer cases.
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Proposed reforms
4.57 We ask consultees their views about the appropriateness of section 8, dealing first with the issue of miscarriages of justice. In 2005, the Department for Constitutional Affairs consulted on whether the common law on the inadmissibility of jury deliberations as evidence should be relaxed to allow investigations into jury impropriety. 134 Although the consultation only received 41 responses, the majority supported the view that the common law should be left to develop and, therefore, section 8 should not be modified. 4.58 We recognise that reforming section 8 to allow jurors to disclose aspects of their deliberations in order to uncover a miscarriage of justice would necessarily require reform of the admissibility of such evidence. Disclosure would be fruitless if the court were unable to consider it in assessing the safety of the conviction. We consider, despite the finding of the majority of the House of Lords in Mirza, 136 that there may be merit in reforming section 8 in order to protect against the risk of a miscarriage of justice. Indeed, as we have explained, it may be necessary in order to render the law ECHR compliant. 137 As Lord Steyn argued when dissenting in Mirza:
There is a positive duty on judges, when things have gone seriously wrong in the criminal justice system, to do everything possible to put it right. In the world of today enlightened public opinion would accept nothing less. It would be contrary to the spirit of these developments to say that in one area, namely the deliberations of the jury, injustice can be tolerated as the price for protecting the jury system. 4.59 It has been argued that in order to prevent a disproportionate interference with article 10, no criminal penalty should be applied to a juror who discloses deliberations in breach of section 8 (that is, disclosure to a party other than a court) in the honest belief that such disclosure will uncover a miscarriage of justice. 139 Fenwick and Phillipson suggest that, so long as the disclosure was to a person who was "a reasonable one to choose in the circumstances" -a defence solicitor perhaps -the juror should not be liable, unless they had been told that any disclosure must be to the court. 140 This would ensure protection for both the juror's article 10 rights, and the defendant's article 6 rights. 141 A defence based on the juror's perception of who it was reasonable to approach may be too vague. A defence could, however, be available if disclosure was to a court official or other specified organisation.
4.60
We have concerns about the extent to which it is clear to jurors at present that they can disclose such matters after the verdict only to a court. 142 Providing more outlets for disclosure could protect well-meaning jurors who disclose their concerns to parties other than a court. It could also act as a further safeguard against miscarriages of justice since jurors would be less likely to keep their concerns to themselves for fear of disclosing to the wrong person in error, and thereby incurring criminal liability. Whilst clearly it is important that the rationale for section 8 is not undermined by a "proliferation" of jurors disclosing their deliberations at will, 143 it is also problematic that such disclosure is currently criminalised, which has the effect of preventing the discovery of wrongful convictions, with all of its serious consequences for the defendant, the victim of the offence and society at large. Do consultees consider that it is necessary to amend section 8 to provide for a specific defence where a juror discloses deliberations to a court official, the police or the Criminal Cases Review Commission in the genuine belief that such disclosure is necessary to uncover a miscarriage of justice?
4.61 In respect of undertaking jury research, the same Department for Constitutional Affairs consultation asked for views about whether section 8 should be modified to allow academic research into jury deliberations. A majority of respondents thought that some form of research should be allowed, but that such research would need to be regulated. 144 Suggestions were made that an ethics panel be appointed to oversee the research; that research should only be undertaken in consultation with, or with the consent of, the Lord Chief Justice; that the consent of the jurors would need to be obtained and they would need to be granted anonymity; and that there should be a code of conduct for jury research. 145 However, a majority of respondents thought that researchers should not be allowed access to the jury deliberating room and that there should be a financial penalty for researchers who breach any of the safeguards. 146 The Department responded that it supported the view that more research into juries should be undertaken, but said that section 8 would not be amended until it was clear that there are research questions which cannot be answered without legislative amendment.
